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1. Introduction 
The geographic concentration of economic activity occurs because transport costs for 
goods, people and ideas give individuals and organisations incentives to locate close to 
each other. If such costs did not exist economic activity would tend to spread evenly over 
space. Historically, all of these transport costs have been falling. For example, the steam 
engine, railways, the combustion engine and the use of containers for transportation have 
all worked to reduce the cost of shipping goods, while the automobile, commuter railways 
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and the airplane have performed a similar role for the cost of moving people. More 
recently, new information and communication technologies (ICT) have also significantly 
reduced the cost of transmitting and communicating information over both long and short 
distances. Such changes could lead us to predict the death of distance. That is, to suggest 
that location will no longer matter and that economic activity will, in the near future, be 
evenly distributed across space. This paper is concerned with one particular aspect of this 
prediction: the impact that less costly communication and transmission of information 
might have on cities, the urban structure and the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
Two innovations in the twentieth century have changed dramatically the cost of 
communicating and transmitting information. The first is the widespread adoption of 
telephony (first fixed line, then mobile), which made possible oral communication over 
long distances. The second main innovation is the internet and E-mail which has played a 
similar role for written documents, voice and images. Both these technologies may require 
substantial upfront fixed investments, but once made they essentially eliminate the link 
between the cost of communication and the distance between locations. 
What are the implications of these changes in ICT for urban structure and the 
distribution of economic activity in space? This paper provides a partial answer to this 
question. We begin with a brief description of the adoption path for a number of recent 
ICT innovations before turning to consider in more detail the ways in which ICT might 
affect urban structure. We next present the main theoretical argument and identification 
strategy. Our model suggests that improvements in ICT will increase the dispersion of 
economic activity across cities. That is, it will make city sizes more uniform. In the 
empirical section, we test this prediction using cross country data and find empirical 
support for this conclusion. A concluding section spells out a number of policy 
implications. 
2. ICT and urban structure 
Figure 1. Private Cars, Mobile Phones and Personal Computers 
About here 
Changes in ICT are very clear in the data, especially if we focus on technology adoption. 
Figure 1 presents the number of cars, phone lines, mobile phones, and personal computers 
during the last five decades, using Comin and Hobijin’s “Historical Cross-Country 
Technological Adoption Dataset” [Comin and Hobijin (2004)]. The adoption of the 
telephone was well under way by the 1950's. By the end of the 1990's, the number of 
telephone lines exceeds 150 million in both Europe and the US. In contrast, changes in 
personal computers are all concentrated in the 1980's and 1990's. The US went from less 
than 5 million computers in the early 1980's to more than 140 million computers in the 
late 1990's. This is a remarkable change that is likely to have very important effects. The 
data show a similar pattern for the EU that went from less than 5 million personal 
computers to 100 million in the late 1990's. The EU and the US have also experienced 
similar dramatic changes in the use of cell phones, but with the growth occurring even 
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later than for personal computers. Mobile telephones technology was practically unused in 
1985, but more than 150 million people owned a mobile phone in the 1990's in the EU, 
and more than 85 million in the US. Of course, these numbers alone do not reflect the 
costs associated with implementation of these technologies but they do show the dramatic 
growth in adoption.  
     Particularly significant is therefore to contrast the linear growth in number of cars or 
phones with the exponential growth in new forms of ICT. If part of the role of cities is to 
save on communication costs, and given that the dramatic growth in ICT adoption has 
clearly lowered these costs, it seems intuitive that these changes could have some 
significant implications for urban structure. It is to these implications that we now turn. 
Economists use the phrase “agglomeration economies” to describe the advantages that 
occur when economic activity is densely concentrated. The first source of agglomeration 
economies is known as human capital or knowledge spillovers. In areas of dense 
economic activity, workers casually exchange knowledge about technology and 
production conditions at their places of employment. Such transfers happen fortuitously 
but also are sometimes sought out deliberately by firms, as anecdotal evidence about life 
in California’s Silicon Valley testifies. A second force for agglomeration is labour market 
pooling. At any point in time, firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. as a result of 
changing demand for their particular product) that makes them want to hire or fire 
workers. Because these shocks are idiosyncratic, when one firm is firing, another firm 
may well be hiring. If firms locate in close proximity to one another, it is easy for workers 
to move from firms experiencing bad times to those experiencing good times. As the 
saying in Silicon Valley goes, “people change jobs but not parking lots.” Agglomeration 
is thus attractive to workers because it helps insure them against idiosyncratic shocks. It is 
also attractive for firms because it weakens the impact of wages to their own idiosyncratic 
shock and thus mitigates in part the effect of uncertainty in the economic environment. 
This actually makes employment in bad times more costly than it would otherwise have 
been, but this is more than compensated for by the ease of expansion in good times. A 
third force for agglomeration comes from the greater variety of intermediate products and 
richer mix of labour skills and expertise that are available in larger urban areas. Greater 
variety of goods and services lowers prices and wages and also enhances firms’ options in 
choosing technologies for production and distribution of their products. The associated 
effects on firms are known as pecuniary externalities (as distinct from real externalities, 
the latter term being reserved for non-market interactions among economic agents’ output 
decisions). Finally, local amenities due to weather, physical attractiveness, culture or 
tradition are important factors in enhancing the appeal of particular urban agglomerations. 
These mechanisms, whose articulation essentially goes back to Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics, explain at least some of the spatial concentration that we 
observe throughout the world. 
Of course, if these agglomeration economies were the only forces driving the location 
of economic activity then we would expect to observe extreme spatial concentration. In 
reality, we do not, because these agglomeration economies are offset by costs (dispersion 
or congestion forces) as activity becomes increasingly concentrated. These costs take 
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many forms but all arise from the fact that competition for local resources, broadly 
defined, increases with spatial concentration. For example, congestion occurs as a result 
of increased competition for space, firms pay higher rents and wages as result of increased 
competition for land and workers, while they receive lower prices for their output as a 
result of increased competition in goods markets. The balance between these 
agglomeration and dispersion forces determines the spatial structure of the economy. 
The strength and importance of these agglomeration and dispersion forces depend on 
many things, including notably the cost of communicating information across space. 
Knowledge spillovers, for example, depend on the role that distance plays in inhibiting 
efficient communication of ideas. The importance of face to face communication shows 
just how dramatic these distance effects can be. But the telephone, the email and video 
conferencing, for example, are all reducing these costs of communicating ideas from a 
distance.  
Changing communication costs may also affect the benefits from labour market 
pooling. Recall, these benefits require workers to move from firm to firm. ICT may 
increase the efficiency of this process as news about vacancies in one firm are more easily 
communicated to workers who may be looking for work. A similar story could be told 
about the benefits of pecuniary externalities. For example, falling information costs allow 
firms to more easily identify potential suppliers of intermediate goods or workers with 
particular skills. Turning to dispersions forces, ICT may facilitate e-working, allowing 
individuals to avoid the high costs of commuting in congested cities. Alternatively, it may 
increase the competition faced by firms as consumers find it easier to identify alternative 
sources of supply. 
Thus, new ways to transport ideas and to communicate information are, in general, 
likely to affect all of the agglomeration and dispersion forces that urban and regional 
economists have identified as key determinants of the concentration of economic activity 
in space. Thus, independently of the sources of agglomeration forces, ICT will likely have 
an impact on spatial concentration. In what follows, we illustrate the potential impact of 
ICT by focusing on production externalities as the main source of agglomeration. This 
gives us a specific prediction about the impact of ICT that we then confirm using real 
world data. These effects may also be consistent with other models where ICT has a 
similar effect on different agglomeration economies. So, our exercise does not allow us to 
discriminate between different models which predict that ICT will disperse economic 
activity across cities. It does, however, suggest that models that predict changes to city 
structure in the opposite direction (i.e. increasing concentration) are not consistent with 
the data. 
ICT can, in principle, have many distinct effects on the distribution of economic 
activity in space. On one hand, it can increase the spatial scope of knowledge spillovers 
— it is easier for any professional to acquire context that helps her assess information she 
casually receives from counterparts in other firms. Therefore, fewer person-to-person 
interactions may suffice to obtain a better understanding of what other firms are up to. To 
the extent that knowledge spillovers, whether deliberate (as among employees of the same 
firm) or fortuitous, are productive, we would expect that ITC would strengthen them 
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among individuals who are located further apart. Local increasing returns are thus less 
localized when a wider set of people across an entire country or across countries can 
interact with each other by using new technologies and while economizing on commuting 
costs. In this sense, improvements in ICT reduce the importance of the quantities of 
productive factors employed in a city on that city’s productivity. This is the stand we take 
on the theory we present in the next section and in more detail in Appendix A. 
This implies that local urban agglomeration effects become less important and lead to 
less concentration of people and jobs in a few successful (and larger cities) or urban 
agglomerations. Agents and firms obtain smaller benefits from locating close to each 
other and so they locate more evenly in space in order to economize on land rents (and 
other congestion costs). ICT, in particular, can help businesses create opportunities by 
improving their communications with other firms, suppliers and clients worldwide. For 
example, real estate, tourism and hotel operators may market their products directly, 
without relying on city-based intermediaries. This is important, as most of recent urban 
growth worldwide has been fuelled by growth in service sectors, while manufacturing has 
been relocating to smaller urban centres with good transportation links [Henderson 
(1997)] and often are outsourced to lower cost countries.  
These arguments associate ICT with greater spatial dispersion in economic activity. 
This would, in turn, imply larger concentration of the city size distribution. That is, it 
would be associated with a reduction in the variance of city sizes. Arguably, this potential 
advantage may not be fully realized if the interurban transportation system does not 
develop sufficiently to serve a greater network of urban centres. However, at any given 
level of development, improvements in ICT increase the incentives for economic activity 
to relocate to smaller urban centres. 
On the other hand, ICT may also make certain local public goods more important as a 
share of consumption or as a share of inputs. Also, changes in the industrial composition 
of cities, which have been favouring services, may on balance foster concentration of 
certain services due to increasing returns at the plant level. London, New York or Paris 
are attractive in part because there are certain products and services that can only be found 
there. Similarly, urban living affords better consumption prospects. As individuals spend 
more on amenities, such as theatres and other artistic activities, certain large cities would 
become relatively more attractive and therefore likely to grow relative to smaller or 
medium size cities. On top of increasing the share of some of these goods and services in 
consumption, better ICT may make these goods and services more readily available and 
cheaper to consume. Clearly, to the extent that public goods (and other forces of urban 
concentration) become effective and far-reaching with ICT, we should observe a more 
dispersed size distribution of cities and a more concentrated spatial distribution of 
economic activity.  
From this verbal discussion -- and other ones in the literature, like Glaeser (1998) which 
is more extensive but still qualitative -- it should be clear that there are two key paths 
through which ICT may affect the urban structure. But it is still not clear which effect is 
likely to dominate. Thus our next step is to develop a theoretical model which will make 
all these connections clear. In particular, it will connect changes in ICT with changes in 
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the size distribution of cities. As we will show, the effect on urban structure generated by 
the model will depend on the particular assumption made on how ICT affects 
agglomeration forces. This relationship is monotonic and so it helps us design an 
empirical exercise that is informative on which of these different effects dominates in 
reality.  
3. A Model of ICT and Urban Evolution 
As discussed above, any reasonable model of urban structure or of the role of space in 
economic activity, more generally, would predict that improvements in ICT should have 
effects on the distribution of economic activity in space. However, no model of urban 
systems seems to have explicitly incorporated the effects of ICT. We use the theory in 
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), from now on RHW, to illustrate how ICT may lead to 
more urban dispersion.  
To reiterate, the trade-off between agglomeration effects —the benefits that firms and 
individuals obtain from being close to each other— and congestion costs determines the 
size of cities. Most of these agglomeration effects are related to interactions of different 
types among individuals. These interactions will be affected by the communication and 
information technology used by these agents. But how will ICT affect agglomeration 
forces? And how will these changes in agglomeration forces change the distribution of 
economic activity in space?  The paper addresses this question by considering the impact 
of these changes on the steady state distribution of city sizes. This requires in turn the 
specification of a fully dynamic model that also accommodates a stochastic structure.   
The potential effect of ICT on the dispersion of the size distribution of cities is not 
obvious. Essentially, we need to understand whether the consequences of productivity 
shocks, or of other shocks that cities may experience, will be more or less persistent, and 
will have larger or smaller effects, the larger agglomeration forces. The model in RHW 
views the connection between agglomeration effects and productivity as mediated by 
industry-specific physical and human capital. Agglomeration effects are the result of an 
externality generated by the amount of human capital and labour employed in the city. 
To illustrate this mechanism, suppose that an industry receives a positive and persistent 
productivity shock. Naturally, firms in the cities that produce in those industries will want 
to produce more. This implies that they want to use more of the industry specific factors. 
But the total availability of those factors is given in the current period. So the price of the 
industry specific physical and human capital increases. The positive productivity shock 
also implies that cities specialized in that industry will grow as firms employ more 
workers. The higher price of the industry specific human and physical capital will create 
incentives to accumulate more of these factors. So next period the industry will have more 
industry specific factors. Because of the agglomeration effects (and this is the key) having 
more of these factors will imply more workers being hired and higher productivity, which 
in turn will elicit further accumulation of factors and induce larger cities, even if next 
period’s productivity shock is lower. That is, the effect of the original productivity shock 
on city size will be persistent through its effect on the accumulation of industry specific 
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factors. The stocks of these factors are determined by the accumulated history of the 
industry’s productivity shocks and, therefore, the size distribution of cities is determined 
by the history of these shocks. It is the long run invariant distribution of these factors 
across industries which then determine the long run invariant size distribution of cities. 
The mechanism described above relies crucially on the impact that the level of human 
and physical capital has on the level of productivity in a city — that is, on the strength of 
the agglomeration effects. The stronger these effects, the larger the impact of past 
productivity and the larger the reaction of city size and industry specific factors to an 
idiosyncratic productivity shock. If agglomeration forces are very small and the 
productivity of an industry producing in a given city is essentially independent of the level 
of human capital and employment in the city (and therefore the level of physical capital), 
today’s productivity shock will have only a temporary effect on city size and no effect on 
the long term stock of these factors. Hence, cities will not grow and may even decline 
substantially depending on the history of shocks to an industry. This implies that all cities 
will have similar sizes and so the distribution of city sizes will be extremely concentrated. 
If all cities are of similar sizes, the distribution of economic activity in space will exhibit a 
lot of dispersion. Note that the more concentrated the size distribution of cities the more 
dispersed the distribution of economic activity in space. 
In contrast, if agglomeration effects depend heavily on the amount of factors employed 
in a city, the effect of past shocks on the stock of industry specific factors will be very 
important. Cities specialized in industries that received a history of good shocks will be 
very large, and cities that received a history of bad shocks will be small. Hence, the size 
distribution of cities will be very dispersed and the distribution of economic activity in 
space will be very concentrated. 
In Appendix A we present the details of the model in RHW that yields the result 
discussed above in an economy. The model allows for accumulation of physical and 
human capital and city creation and yields a realistic size distribution of cities. However, 
the main economic mechanism can be illustrated in a much simplified model, albeit a 
static and partial equilibrium one, which we sketch here. Consider a city with an 
aggregate production function that implies output per person in the form 
Y = A(N)T( N), 
where ( )A N AN ε= % , is total employment in the city, N A% is a productivity shock and 
( )T N TN τ−=  the time agents have left for work after commuting. The latter specification 
is a short hand in order to express the combined effect of declining marginal productivity 
of labour and congestion. For an exact derivation within a dynamic general equilibrium 
model, please see Appendix A. An alternative derivation that is also helpful in 
understanding interurban spillovers is given in the comment by one of our discussants, 
Omer Moav, following the paper. We assume that the respective elasticities satisfy  τ ε>  
so that in effect city production is subject to diminishing returns.  
The parameter ε  plays a key role in our analysis. It captures the extent to which the 
size of the city affects its productivity through knowledge spillovers. More specifically, ε  
denotes the elasticity of productivity with respect to city size. We model this elasticity as 
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a result of knowledge spillovers, but in fact it can be the result of any other agglomeration 
mechanism. Note that the level of ε  will also affect the average size of spillovers. So an 
increase in ε  will tend to induce concentration in large cities.  
With free labour mobility across cities and identical productivity shock process in all 
cities it has to be the case that income per person is the same across cities. Call this 
equilibrium income level . Then  by using the above specifications we have: w
ATN wε τ− =% , 




τ ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
%
. (1) 
So the elasticity of with respect to N A%  is equal to 1 ( )τ ε− . Now let the quality of 
ICT determine the value of ε . If ε  decreases with better ICT, an improvement in ICT 
leads to a decrease in the elasticity of city sizes with respect to idiosyncratic shocks and, 
in the long run (under some technical conditions), to a decrease in the variance of the size 
distribution of cities. If, in contrast, ICT increases ε then it increases the elasticity of city 
sizes with respect to idiosyncratic shocks and, in the long run, it increases the variance of 
the size distribution of cities. So the actual effect of ICT on ε  is, ultimately, an empirical 
question that we try to settle in this paper. A similar analysis may be cast in terms of a 
possible role of telecommuting in affecting the elasticity of time left for work with respect 
to total city employment, but will not be discussed here for reasons of brevity. Again, the 
model presented in Appendix A allows for much greater generality and detail.  
Of course, changes in ICT will in general change the level of technology too. Local 
interactions may become less important with ICT, but global ones will then become more 
important. The latter change would be reflected in an increase in the mean of A% .  
Ideally one would model explicitly the decision of agents in a city to adopt ICT. This 
has not been done in the literature in a way that may be readily adopted for our purposes. 
Here we only study the effect on urban structure given exogenous technology adoption 
decisions. We refrain from developing such a theory because it is unlikely that in view of 
our data we would be able to distinguish between alternative theories of the precise role of 
ICT in affecting the elasticities of the spillover effects.  
As it is easy to note, the role played in the dynamic version by the persistence of shocks 
trough their effect on the accumulation of industry specific factors is substituted in this 
simple model by the distribution of productivity shocks itself. Therefore this simple 
model cannot, by design, generate a realistic size distribution of cities or a realistic pattern 
of city dynamics. However, it is important to make sure that the logic of the example 
survives in a model that can generate basic features of the urban hierarchy. This is not 
immediate since changes in ε  (through ICT) will in general change the accumulation of 
factors and therefore the distribution of productivities in our simple model above. The 
dynamic general equilibrium model in Appendix A confirms that the basic insight of the 
simple model in the previous paragraphs, and the logic outlined at the beginning of this 
section, goes through in a more complete economic environment.  
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4. Empirical Methodology 
Our theoretical model, as developed in Appendix A, predicts that ICT should make the 
distribution of city sizes in the long run more concentrated if it weakens agglomeration 
effects. We study this prediction empirically by looking at the effect of ICT on the 
distribution of city sizes across different countries. 
Box 1 
About here 
Unfortunately, as will be clear when we discuss our data in Section 5 below, the 
available data only tend to cover the larger cities in each country. This is a problem for 
our empirical implementation because such truncated data (i.e. data that do not cover the 
smaller cities) do not allow us to calculate the mean and variance of the entire city size 
distribution directly. To get around this problem, we proceed as follows. First, we assume 
that the city size distribution is Pareto (alternatively referred to as following a power law). 
Given this assumption we can express the log of the proportion of cities that are larger 
than S, that is the log of the counter-cumulative of the size distribution of cities, as a linear 
function of log city size:  
ln ( ) ln lnoP s S S Sζ ζ> = − + ,   (2) 
where  denotes the minimum city size, which defines the lower bound of the city size 
distribution, and 
oS
ζ the elasticity of the proportion of cities larger than S with respect to S.  
The latter is a negative number that is commonly referred to as the Zipf coefficient. See 
Box 1 for details. Given a set of cities and their sizes, an estimate of the Zipf coefficient is 
provided by running a regression of log rank on log city size. When the distribution is 
Pareto the Zipf coefficient can be consistently estimated by running the regression only on 
the sample of the larger cities, that is the upper tail of the distribution. 
We have underscored the model’s prediction that improvements in ICT will decrease 
the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of cities. In Appendix A we show that this 
leads to a higher absolute value of the Zipf coefficient, ( )Sζ . Hence, the absolute value 
of the Zipf coefficient increases with improvements in ICT, at least when attention is 
restricted to the upper tail of city sizes. In other words, improvements in the quality of 
ICT decrease the variance of the size distribution while they increase the absolute value of 
the Zipf coefficient. Since the Zipf coefficient is negative, they decrease its algebraic 
value. This result holds independently of whether or not the city size distribution is 
Pareto. Of course, if it is not Pareto, the Zipf coefficient will not be a constant, but the 
model predicts that its value will change in the same direction for all, large enough, city 
sizes. It is important to note that even though our basic theory implies a Pareto 
distribution of city sizes only for particular cases (see RHW for details), we approach the 
data using Zipf coefficients that are specified as independent of city size. That is, we 
assume that the size distribution is always Pareto. 
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So our assumption of a particular distribution for city sizes gives us a specification that 
can be estimated given the data that we have at our disposal and that allows us to directly 
test our theory on the impact of ICT on the city size distribution. The crucial question is 
then, of course, whether this is an appropriate assumption. It turns out that empirical 
evidence gives us good reason to think that the Pareto distribution is a reasonable fit for 
real world city size distributions across a large numbers of countries and at many different 
points in time. Even if the distribution is not Pareto, it is likely that reductions in variance 
will be associated with change for the Zipf coefficient (as discussed above) in the same 
direction. In the discussion of our empirical results, section 6 below, we also address this 
concern by presenting robustness checks using other measures of dispersion in the upper 
tail. 
Once we have the estimated Zipf coefficient, we may use it as a summary of the city 
size distribution for different countries and examine how variations in the city size 
distribution may be attributed to the observed changes in ICT. Clearly a large number of 
other factors will determine the city size distribution and we will need to control for these 
if we want to isolate the effect of ICT. We discuss and motivate these additional controls 
in the results section below. 
To capture the effects of ICT we use data on the number of telephone lines and on 
access to the internet. Our main focus is on the number of telephone lines for several 
reasons. First, because we have more data. Second, because the impact on the urban 
structure will take time and, as Figure 1 shows, the rapid adoption of internet technology 
has only occurred relatively recently. Third, because for telephone lines we have a way to 
deal with the endogeneity problem for ICT. That is, we have a way to control for the fact 
that the number of telephone lines may be driven by the urban structure, rather than the 
other way round. As no such instrumental variable is available for the internet, our results 
when we use access to the internet as an additional explanatory variable are necessarily 
more speculative (although both sets of results point in the same direction). We discuss 
this issue further below after we provide details of our empirical strategy.  
The Zipf coefficient for a country  in year c t  is obtained from the following 
regression: 
ict ct ct ict ictR P eλ ζ= + + , (3) 
where  is the log of the rank of city  in country  in year ln(rank )ict ictR = i c t ,  is the 
log population of that city, 
ictP
ctλ  is a country-year specific intercept, and ctζ  is a country-
year specific Zipf coefficient. 
We follow Rosen and Resnick (1980) and subsequently Soo (2005) in seeking to 
understand the determinants of the Zipf coefficient ctζ  in (3) in terms of country 
characteristics: 
ct c ct ctt Xζ θ δ η ε= + + + , (4) 
where cθ  is a constant which may be country specific, δ  is a linear time trend  and  is 
a vector of unknown coefficients. The parameter 
η
cθ , sometimes known as a country fixed 
effect, controls for the fact that the Zipf coefficient may be higher or lower for some 
particular country in all years for reasons that are unobservable to us as researchers.  The 
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linear time trend controls for the fact that the Zipf coefficient may be increasing or 
decreasing over time for all countries for reasons that, again, are unobservable to us as 
researchers.  Finally, the coefficients in η  capture the effect of changes in explanatory 
variables (including ICT) on the Zipf coefficient.  The coefficients in equation (4) can be 
estimated by means of a regression of Zipf coefficients for each country and year, ˆctζ , 
that are estimated according to (3), on a collection of explanatory variables ctX  that are 
thought to determine the city size distribution.  
We make three modifications to this standard approach. The first deals with a potential 
bias in the estimation of the Zipf coefficient. In a recent paper, Gabaix and Ibragimov 
(2006) return to a known bias of the estimate of the Zipf coefficient from Equation (3). 
This bias arises from the fact that ranks and sizes are obviously correlated. The bias is 
strong in small samples and their proposed correction1is to use  in 
place of the log rank in the left hand side of Equation (3). 
ln(rank 0.5)ict ictR
∗ = −
The second modification exploits the fact that we have panel data (i.e. data on cities and 
country characteristics for several years) to control for unobserved country specific 
determinants of differences in the city size distribution. This is captured by the country 
specific intercept, or fixed effect, cθ  in equation (4). Of course, as usual, if ctX  contains 
time invariant observed characteristics then their coefficients cannot be separately 
identified via econometric procedures because the country specific intercept captures all 
time invariant differences across countries whatever their source.  
The third modification deals with the likely endogeneity of telephone lines with respect 
to the urban structure. We want to be able to interpret the coefficient on telephone lines 
from equation (4) as capturing the impact on the Zipf coefficient of changing the number 
of telephone lines per capita.  That is, we want to be able to talk about the causal effect of 
ICT on urban structure. But what if changes to the urban structure come from some other 
source (say the increasing use of the automobile, which incidentally we do control for, in 
part via the road density variable) and countries respond to this by changing the number of 
telephone lines per capita? Then, the number of telephone lines per capita would be driven 
by a different underlying factor and thus a function of urban structure, and thus be 
endogenous. In such a case, our regression will capture an association between ICT and 
urban structure which includes both the direct causal effect (from ICT to urban structure) 
and any indirect feedback effects (from urban structure to ICT).  In the worst case 
scenario, there may actually be no causal effect of ICT on urban structure, but we may 
reach the erroneous conclusion that there is an effect, because our regressions pick up the 
reverse feedback effect from urban structure to ICT. To control for this we adopt an 
instrumental variables approach.  That is, we look for some variables (i.e. country 
characteristics) that (1) do not change if the urban structure changes for some exogenous 
reason (e.g. the increase in the availability of the automobile) and that (2) do not 
themselves independently affect the urban structure but that are (3) correlated with the 
                                                          
1 According to Gabaix and Ibragimov (2006), Theorem 1, the correction of the bias in 
the OLS estimate is optimal in the sense that the proposed transformation of the 
dependent variable reduces the bias to leading order only. 
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number of telephone lines. We can then use these instrumental variables to capture the 
causal effect of the number of telephone lines on urban structure. To do this, we first 
predict the number of telephone lines in a given country and year on the basis of the 
values of the instrumental variables. We then include these predicted values in place of 
the actual values of telephone lines in equation 4.  If we find that these predicted values of 
telephone lines still have an affect on urban structure, then we can reason as follows.  We 
know that the predicted values are not capturing any direct effect of the instrumental 
variables on urban structure (because we assumed – condition (2) – that these variables do 
not independently affect the urban structure). We also know that the predicted values 
cannot be capturing any feedback effect from urban structure to ICT because we are 
predicting phone lines per capita as a function of the instrumental variables (and we 
assumed – condition (1) –  that these variables were independent of exogenous changes to 
urban structure). Thus, the predicted values must be capturing the causal impact of ICT on 
urban structure. Of course, for this strategy to work our instrumental variables must be 
correlated with ICT – condition (3) – so that the predicted values bear some relation to the 
actual values.  
 Our idea is to construct instrumental variables based on the market structure in the 
telecommunications sector. Clearly market structure in the telecommunications sector 
should affect the number of phone lines thus satisfying the third condition for a valid 
instrument. Results that we report below show that this is indeed the case. 
Telecommunications market structure is also unlikely to have a direct effect on the urban 
structure (independent of its affect on ICT), thus satisfying the second condition for a 
valid instrument. What about the first condition that telecommunication market structure 
is not affected if urban structure changes for some exogenous reason? We find it hard to 
come up with a convincing story where market structure is directly affected by changes to 
the urban structure. But it is possible to come up with stories where both market structure 
and urban structure are being driven by some common factor that we have omitted from 
our estimation. For example the general trend towards liberalisation of the economy 
during the 1980’s affected many sectors in addition to the telecommunications sector. 
Perhaps it was the reform of one of these sectors (e.g. transport) that changed urban 
structure. In that case, our instrument will fail to satisfy the first condition because it is 
actually changes in attitudes to liberalisation (exogenous to our model) that are changing 
both urban structure and market structure. By including other measures of liberalisation, 
we are able to provide some indirect evidence that this is not the case and that our 
instruments are likely to be valid.  But, formally, conditions (1) and (2) are “maintained 
assumptions” that cannot be easily tested and the instrumental approach relies on their 
holding. We find these assumptions reasonable, but some readers may not do, in which 
case our assertion of a causal effect of ICT on urban structure will need to be interpreted 
with caution.  
We can identify three broad market structures for the countries in our sample during the 
years that we study: competitive, public or private monopoly. Two of the instruments that 
we use are dummies for whether the country has a public monopoly or a private 
monopoly with a competitive structure as the excluded category. The other two 
THE EFFECT OF ICT ON URBAN STRUCTURE 13 
 
                                                          
instruments measure the time that has passed since the end of the private and public 
monopolies for countries that have liberalised their telecommunications sector. As no 
such instrumental variables are available for the internet, our results when we use access 
to the internet as an additional explanatory variable are necessarily more speculative 
(although both sets of results do point in the same direction). 
Finally, in addition, we report in Appendix B a fourth modification which increases the 
efficiency of the estimators by implementing a one-step procedure that simultaneously 
estimates equations (3) and (4). 
Before turning to the implementation of our approach, we re-iterate that, although we 
rely on the Pareto law to motivate our econometric approach, our estimations should 
capture more generally the impact upon the entire distribution of city sizes that emanate 
from changes in underlying determinants of interest. 
5. Data 
We use the same city data as that used in Soo (2005), which were taken from Thomas 
Brinkhoff's City Population project (http://www.citypopulation.de). Soo's paper provides 
a fairly extensive discussion of the nature of the data, particularly with regard to the issue 
of the definition of cities.2 Data on population, GDP per capita in 2000 Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP), trade and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, non-agricultural 
economic activity and land area come from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (online). Data on kilometres of roads come from the International Road 
Federation World Road Statistics.3 GDP growth is calculated as log difference of GDP in 
2000 PPP; its volatility is measured as the empirical standard deviation over the observed 
time period. 
We use two different measures to evaluate the role of ICT in determining the city size 
distribution: telephones and the internet. As already discussed, our main focus is on 
telephones, because we have data for a longer time period and can construct a set of 
potential instruments. Data on the number of telephone land lines and internet users per 
1000 also come from the World Bank World Development Indicators. We multiply these 
numbers by 1000 and use per capita measure of phone lines and internet users in the 
estimations. 
The information on the market structure of the telecommunications sector (private or 
public monopoly versus competitive provision) that we use to instrument the number of 
2 We use data on cities as opposed to urban agglomerations because they are more 
consistently available internationally.  
3 Further details on all these variables are provided in Soo (2005). A large number of 
our explanatory variables were also kindly provided by Kwok Tong Soo and 
supplemented by the authors. 
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telephone lines comes from the OECD International Regulation Database.4 This same 
source provides the data that we use to capture the general degree of competition in the 
economy when considering the validity of our instruments. 
We start with city-level data for 73 countries covering 7,530 different cities recorded at 
various time periods between 1972 and 2001. There are 197 country-year pairs meaning 
that, on average, we observe each country 2.7 times. Detailed inspection of the data 
reveals that the relevant explanatory variables are missing for many countries. 
Fortunately, the variables are available for three blocks of countries -- North America, 
Europe and some of the former countries of the Soviet Union.5 Deleting countries with 
missing data leaves us with 24 countries covering 2,955 cities recorded at various time 
periods between 1980 and 2000. There are now 63 country-year pairs meaning that, on 
average, we observe each country 2.6 times. For the internet regressions we have to drop 
Mexico and restrict the time period to 1990 to 2000. This gives us 23 countries and 41-
country year pairs covering 2,792 cities. Error! Reference source not found. presents 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis below. Additional 
details on our data variable definitions may be found in the online Data Appendix. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
About here 
6. Results 
We start by estimating Equation (3) for each country-year pair to get some idea of the 
distribution of Zipf coefficients for the countries in question. The mean Zipf coefficient 
across our 63 country-year pairs is -1.370. The maximum value is -0.928 for Belarus in 
1998, the minimum is -1.714 for Belgium in 2000. Interestingly, for all country-year pairs 
we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the Zipf coefficient is equal to one.6 That is, we 
strongly reject Zipf’s law, strictly construed as an estimated Zipf coefficient (ζ  - the 
                                                          
4 See the Indicators of Product Market Regulation Homepage at: 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/pmr and described in Conway (2006). Missing data points for 
Eastern European countries were filled by the authors based on media coverage. 
5 Specifically, we use data on Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. We have to drop Germany 
because of the reunification of 1990 and the ensuing adoption of Federal Republic of 
Germany institutions in former German Democratic Republic territory causes 
definitional problems.  
6 Our result are broadly in line with those reported in Soo's 2005 table 1 which are for 
the last year for each country-pair and which do not implement the Gabaix-Ibragimov 
correction. 
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elasticity of the proportion of cities larger than S with respect to S) being equal to 1.  See 
Box 1, for more details. 
We now turn to consider the effect that ICT has on the city size distribution as 
summarized by the Zipf coefficient. As discussed in the data section, our main focus is on 
the impact of phone lines. Figure 2 plots our estimates of Zipf coefficients for different 
countries at different times against the number of telephone lines. Two things stand out 
from the plot. The first is that, overall, the relationship between Zipf coefficients and the 
number of telephone lines is as predicted. Second, looking at individual countries, we can 
see the same effect replicated within the country in terms of changes over time. This is, 
perhaps, easiest to see for Belgium (BEL) and Austria (AUT), but careful inspection will 
convince the reader that a similar pattern is observed for many countries. The rest of this 
section formalises the findings that emerge from this scatter plot, showing that they are 
robust to the introduction of additional explanatory variables and to controlling for the 
endogeneity of telephone lines. 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Zipf Coefficients against Telephone  
Mainlines, different countries and years. 
About here 
We begin by estimating the simplest possible specification where we treat phone lines 
and a time trend as the only variable that explains differences in the Zipf coefficient 
across countries and time. That is, we estimate Equation (4) with phone lines and time as 
the only explanatory variable ( ctX ). The results are shown in column [1] of Error! 
Reference source not found.. The positive time trend picks up the fact that, on average, 
across all countries, variance in the city size is increasing over time. Our focus, however 
is on phone lines and we find that these have a significant negative impact on the Zipf 
coefficient. That is, the more phone lines a country has, the more concentrated is its city 
size distribution. This is consistent with our theoretical result that improvements in ICT 
(or, in the data, an increase in the number of phone lines) lead to smaller local external 
effects and therefore a more concentrated city size distribution. 
 
Table 2: Phone lines and the city size distribution 
About here 
Clearly, there are many omitted characteristics of countries that could be correlated 
with both phone lines and the degree to which population is spread out across the city size 
distribution. Column [2] begins to address this problem by including several additional 
explanatory variables. Before turning to discussing the empirical results, we briefly 
motivate each of the additional control variables.  
We include the inverse of road density as a proxy for transport costs within the country. 
Countries with a low road density are likely to have high transport costs encouraging 
population to concentrate in just a few cities. Thus, we expect the coefficient on inverse 
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road density to be positive (fewer roads imply higher inverse road density, higher 
transport costs and urban population that is more concentrated in fewer cities). 
We include three variables to control for the economic and geographic size of the 
country: population, income and land area. More densely populated countries are likely to 
have more equal city size distribution, so we expect the coefficient on population to be 
negative while that on land area should be positive. Although we do not constrain the 
coefficients to be equal, these two variables could pick up other effects, thus introducing 
some ambiguity about the expected signs on their coefficients. Given our focus on more 
developed countries we have no strong prior on the sign of the coefficient on GDP. 
Models in the New Economic Geography tradition predict that our measure of trade 
openness (trade as a percentage of GDP) should have a negative effect on spatial 
concentration and hence on the Zipf coefficient because international trade weakens 
agglomeration forces (See Chapter 18 of Fujita et al., 1999). Similarly, we would expect 
higher agricultural production to lead to less concentration and a flatter city size 
distribution. That is, we expect the coefficient on non-agricultural sectors as a percentage 
of GDP to be positive. A measure of the size of government (government expenditure as a 
share of GDP) allows for the possibility that larger governments may imply higher 
population concentration. That would indeed be the case if (as Ades and Glaeser (1995) 
emphasize) rent seeking behaviour encourages citizens to locate close to policy makers in 
the capital city. Conversely, large governments have more means to work against 
agglomeration forces and support peripheral regions through regional policies. Thus we 
have no strong priors on the sign of the coefficient on government expenditure. 
 Finally, we include the standard deviation of the rate of growth of real GDP since the 
theory underlying our approach (discussed in Appendix A) indicates that a higher 
volatility of total factor productivity shocks should lead to a larger variance of the size 
distribution and therefore larger Zipf coefficients. We also include the number of cities as 
a convenient way of allowing for non-linearities in the Zipf regression.7
Results reported in column [2] are in line with our expectations for all variables except, 
trade as a percentage of GDP (which has the wrong sign), and the inverse of road density 
and the volatility of GDP (which are insignificant). Introducing country fixed effects and 
instrumenting for phone lines per capita alters these findings so we consider the issue no 
further for now. Instead, we draw attention to the fact that introducing all of these controls 
does not change our conclusion on the role of phone lines. The coefficient is still negative 
and significant, albeit slightly smaller in absolute value. Thus, introducing a large number 
of additional controls does not change our conclusion that telephone lines are associated 
with more concentrated city size distributions. 
7 Several studies, including notably Black and Henderson (2003), have emphasised 
that the log rank - log population relationship is roughly concave. The relationship 
therefore exhibits a steep (negative) slope for the highest ranked cities and a flatter (still 
negative) slope for lower rank cities. Increasing the number of cities may therefore have 
a positive impact on the coefficient. 
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Columns [3] and [4] of Error! Reference source not found. report results after 
introducing a country-specific fixed effect. Column [3] reports results when phone lines 
and a time trend are the only explanatory variable in ctX . Column [4] reports results when 
we include the additional control variables. Note that the coefficients for four time 
invariant variables cannot be identified in the fixed effect specification. These variables 
are time invariant either because of data availability (government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, standard deviation of GDP growth) or because they show very little 
time series variation (land area and number of cities). Moving from column [2] to column 
[3] we see that introducing unobservable country-specific effects decreases the absolute 
value of the coefficient on phone lines, although the coefficient remains negative and 
significant. Introducing additional controls in column [4] now leaves the effect of 
telephone lines per capita essentially unchanged. Note that, as alluded to above, the 
introduction of fixed effects now gives us signs on inverse road density and on trade as a 
percentage of GDP that are consistent with our theory (although only trade is significant) 
Thus, our finding that telephone lines are associated with less dispersed city size 
distributions is robust to controlling for other country characteristics both observed and 
unobserved. 
Of course, one may still worry that the relationship is being driven by time varying 
unobserved characteristics of countries and that it is changes in these unobserved 
characteristics that drive changes in urban structure which, in turn drive changes in our 
explanatory variables. For example, increasing car ownership may lead to the dispersion 
of population and telephone lines then respond to that dispersion (rather than vice versa). 
To control for this, we adopt the standard solution of looking for instrumental variables as 
discussed, in depth, at the end of section 4.  
One might have similar concerns about inverse road density as a proxy for transport 
costs. That is, more dispersed population leads to more roads and lower transport costs 
rather than transport costs driving population dispersion. We have experimented with 
lagged road density as an instrument but this resulted in considerable reductions in sample 
size and little change in the coefficient on road density. As our main interest is in the ICT 
variables, which we are able to instrument, we do not worry about this further other than 
to note that the coefficients on inverse road density should be interpreted with caution.8 
We assume that all other right hand side variables are exogenous. 
Table 3: First stage regressions for Table 2 
About here 
                                                          
8 In an earlier version of this paper, we also tried to instrument for trade as a percentage 
of GDP using two dummies indicating when a country joined EU or NAFTA. These two 
variables turned out to be very weak instruments for trade, but reasonable additional 
instruments for ICT.  For this reason, we no longer instrument trade, but continue to use 
these two additional instruments.  We note that instrumenting trade using these regional 
trade agreement dummies does not change our main finding on ICT.  Using only the 
market structure instruments  for ICT also does not change our results. 
THE EFFECT OF ICT ON URBAN STRUCTURE 18 
 
First stage regression results from the regression of phone lines per capita on the 
exogenous and instrumental variables are reported in Table 3. In the cross section (column 
[5]), both public and private sector monopolies significantly decrease the number of 
telephone lines. Adding additional control variables (column [6]) substantially weakens 
the effect of the instruments. However, once we have included a fixed effect (columns [7] 
and [8]) we see that public monopolies are significantly positively associated with the 
number of phone lines. The F-test on the joint significance of the instruments for our 
preferred specification (column [8]) show that the model is fairly well instrumented (i.e. 
our instruments are fairly highly partially correlated with ICT).  
Some of the time series variation in these variables comes from liberalization that 
moved countries from private monopolies to competition. Most of the variation, however, 
comes from privatization coupled with liberalization which moved countries from public 
monopolies to competition.9 Our results in the most relevant specification in column [8] 
suggest that, at least in terms of the number of phone lines, the efficiency effects of 
liberalization were outweighed by changes to public service agreements and the tendency 
for newly privatized firms to reduce the cross-subsidisation of residential lines by 
business users. Note that in all cases the predicted phone lines from the first stage 
regressions are increasing over time. The general increase of telephone mainlines is 
explained by the time trends as well as increases in population, road density, and GDP. 
Columns [5]-[8] in Table 2 show what happens when we use these variables to 
instrument for the number of phone lines. Column [5] ignores country fixed effects and 
includes instrumented phone lines as the only explanatory variable. Comparing to column 
[1] we see that our results change very little. The effect of phone lines turns insignificant 
as we introduce more explanatory variables (compare column [6] to column [2]) but it is 
again significant if we introduce fixed effects with phone lines on their own (column [7] 
versus column [3]) and if we introduce fixed effects and time-varying explanatory 
variables (column [8] versus column [4]). 
In sum, we find a robust negative significant effect of the number of phone lines per 
capita on the Zipf coefficient. Over our study period, increasing phone lines per capita 
have tended to cause the dispersion of population across the urban structure resulting in a 
more concentrated city size distribution. 
Columns [1] and [2] of Table 4 show that we reach a similar conclusion for the impact 
of the internet on the city size distribution. Column [1] presents results from a regression 
of Zipf coefficients on the number of internet users per capita and a time trend. That is, 
from estimating equation (4) with internet users per capita and a time trend as the only 
explanatory variable ( ctX ). We see a negative significant effect on the Zipf coefficient, 
although the effect is smaller than that of phone lines. Column [2] shows what happens 
when we introduce the same additional controls as we did for phone lines. Introducing 
additional controls more than halves the absolute value of the coefficient on internet users 
                                                          
9 During the time period we consider there were no privatisations that replace a public 
monopoly with a private monopoly, although this had certainly happened in earlier 
periods (e.g. in the United Kingdom). 
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per capita and turns it insignificant. Columns [3] and [4] show that the negative effect of 
the internet vanishes once we also consider telephone mainlines. Results, not reported 
here, show that instrumenting by means of the same set of instrumental variables gives 
very similar coefficients, but at a slightly lower level of significance (5% instead of 1% in 
column [1]). Only 16 countries have more than one year of data for internet usage so, not 
surprisingly, implementing the fixed effects specification gives insignificant results. 
Finally, introducing fixed effects and instrumenting leads to coefficients that are 
essentially zero.10 This is hardly surprising given the limited number of observations and 
the fact that market structure in the telecommunications sector does not provide good 
instruments for the number of internet connections. 
Our results about the effect of internet connections on urban structure are encouraging 
for another reason, too. As Figure 1 documents, the incidence of mobile telephony 
adoption is similar to that of the internet.  While direct measures of mobile telephony are 
available for some countries, the pattern of availability as of now would reduce 
substantially sample size. We think it is difficult to find good instruments, especially since 
the development of mobile telephony markets have been influenced by the different 
standards adopted by providers. Therefore, we take the results of the internet connections, 
where in fact telephone use is also controlled for, as suggestive of the impact of mobile 
telephony, a technology that is conceptually akin to a combination of telephony and the 
internet.11
6.1. Additional robustness checks 
A question concerning the nature of our instrumental variables strategy arises from 
considering the literature on the political economy of urbanization. This literature 
suggests that urban concentration may be driven by the general degree of competition in 
the economic and political spheres. This raises the possibility that some measure of the 
degree of competition in the economy should be included directly in the regression, 
violating the second requirement for the validity of an instrument (that it should have no 
direct effect on urban structure). Using this line of reasoning, one could argue, for 
example, that the industrial organization of the telecommunications sector is actually just 
proxying for an overly centralized public sector which favours larger cities. To 
summarise, if industrial organization of the telecommunications sector is capturing other 
factors that have a direct effect on urban concentration, then it is inappropriate as an 
instrument. We explore this possibility by controlling for the general degree of 
competition in the economy using the OECD “RegRef” indicators of regulatory 
10 These results are available on request and documented in the Data Appendix. 
11 Modern mobile, that is cellular telephony was not invented in the same countries 
where it was first commercialized, such as Japan, but did indeed spread fast in sparsely 
populated countries, such as the Nordic European countries, with whom is indeed 
nowadays closely associated. Still, adoption per capita is greatest is densely populated 
but small countries, like Hong Kong and Luxemburg.  
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conditions in the airlines, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight 
industries of member countries (Conway and Nicoletti (2006)). The OECD claims that the 
RegRef indicators are a good proxy for the overall degree of competition in the economy. 
The RegRef indicators are, unfortunately, only available for a subset of the countries in 
our data set. Specifically, data are not available for Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mexico, 
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, and Slovak Republic leaving 45 country-year pairs 
instead of the 63 pairs originally. Re-estimation of the original model (column [8] in 
Table 2) with the reduced set of countries produces a stronger effect for phone lines, -
0.308, which is significant at 1%. Including the average of all RegRef indicators as an 
additional explanatory variable only slightly reduces the effect of phone lines to -0.280 
and its significance to 2%. The coefficient on this new explanatory variable is virtually 
zero and highly insignificant.12 Taken together these results suggest that concerns about 
the validity of our instrument as a result of political economy stories are theoretically 
interesting, but empirically invalid. 
Another question concerns what happens with other measures of urban concentration. 
We have experimented with the Gini index, the normalized Herfindahl concentration 
index and the coefficient of variation as dependent variables. These measures reflect 
different aspects of dispersion and are defined at the country level. The coefficient of 
variation, a standard measure of dispersion, averages the squared deviations from the 
mean and then divides by the mean. The normalized Herfindahl concentration index 
reflects squared normalized city sizes. The Gini coefficient is the mean absolute deviation 
among all pairs of cities, relative to the mean city size. Table 5 reports results for the 
coefficient on telephone lines for the same eight specifications that appear in Table 2. 
Remarkably for such different measures of dispersion, the results for the coefficients of 
telephones line per capita with the Gini and Herfindahl indices as dependent variables are 
– up to a scale factor – very similar to the two-step using Zipf (although just statistically 
insignificant in column [8]). The coefficient estimates with the coefficient of variation as 
a dependent variable are also negative and thus consistent with our findings using the Zipf 
coefficient. It is worth recalling, however, that our choice of Zipf coefficient as a measure 
for urban concentration is not arbitrary, being driven instead by a desire to link our 
empirical results firmly with our theoretical model of urban structure. In contrast, while 
all three of these alternative measures of urban concentration appear intuitive, when 
estimated on the truncated sample of larger cities they are not consistent estimators of the 
population variables and cannot be linked to our theoretical prediction of decreasing 
variance for all cities. For this reason, the Zipf coefficient results represent our preferred 
specification and we take these robustness checks as broadly consistent with our overall 
findings.  
12 These results are available on request and documented in the Data Appendix. 
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7. Policy Discussion and Conclusion 
We find robust evidence that increases in the number of telephone lines per capita lead to 
a more concentrated distribution of city sizes and so correspondingly to more dispersion 
in the distribution of economic activity in space. The basic model that underlies our 
approach rationalizes this empirical result. As access to telephones improves, the ensuing 
changes in city size distributions imply that local production externalities decrease. That 
results in an urban structure that is less dependent on past shocks and hence a size 
distribution of cities with smaller variance. This smaller variance is reflected in Zipf 
coefficients that are larger in absolute value.  
Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of our empirical results (using column [8] in Table 2). 
It assumes that the size distribution of city sizes is Pareto, that the smallest city has 
100000 inhabitants and plots the distribution for the average Zipf coefficient in our data 
(labelled ‘actual’ in the figure) and the distribution we would expect if the log of phone 
lines per capita increases by one standard deviation (all other effects are set to zero as this 
is just for illustration purposes). The figure also compares these two distributions with the 
one associated with Zipf’s law, that is, a Pareto distribution with coefficient minus one, 
according to Equation (2). The increase in phone lines per capita concentrates the 
distribution, by making the Zipf relationship steeper. If ICT improves, cities are not as 
large. For example, the share of cities with more than a million inhabitants is reduced by 
0.6 percentage points. Since the share of cities with populations larger than a million is 
about 4.3%, this implies about a 14% decrease in the number of these large cities. This is 
a significant change in urban structure! 
Figure 3. Effect of Phone Lines per Capita on the Size Distribution of Cities. 
About here 
We argue that the internet is likely to have similar, or even larger, effects on urban 
structures once its use has spread more thoroughly through the different economies. So far 
the evidence on internet usage is more speculative, although it goes in the same direction. 
The data suggest that as the number of internet users increases we should see effects that 
are about one tenth of the size of the ones we observe for phone lines. As we argue in the 
introduction, massive internet adoption is a fairly recent phenomenon, and at least in so 
far as our measurement of the extent of its adoption is concerned, urban structure may 
take some time to adjust. This may explain the small coefficients we find in the data. 
We find that public and private monopolies on average increase the number of phone 
lines per capita. An average country with a public monopoly will therefore have a more 
concentrated size distribution of cities. These effects are also economically substantial. If 
the average country with a public telephone monopoly transitions to a competitive 
telecommunications sector, our results indicate that the change in the distribution of city 
sizes should be about a tenth of the change in Figure 3, but in the opposite direction. That 
is, the Zipf curve will become flatter as the number of larger cities increases. According to 
our calculations above, this change would lead to an increase of around 9% in the number 
of cities with more than a million residents. 
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Even though the analysis in this paper allows us to derive conclusions about the effect 
of ICT on the urban structure, as it stands it is not designed to derive implications on 
welfare. So far we can conclude that according to the theory above, ICT causes a decrease 
in the strength of intra-urban spillovers. That is, ICT reduces the importance of local 
factors of production on the city's productivity and has led to the evolution of a more 
uniform distribution of cities. So far, it looks like ICT trades off spatial concentration of 
economic activity for total factor productivity, and thus bears a conceptual similarity to 
infrastructure and other regional policies, that are discussed by Martin (1999) and 
Baldwin et al. (2003), Ch. 17, and typically generate tradeoffs. However, increases in the 
scope (from urban to possibly regional, national or international) of spillovers or factor 
complementarities are likely to be associated with ICT as well. As the scope of 
externalities increases, we should also expect increases in the growth rate of total factor 
productivity everywhere. ICT implies not only smaller local spillovers but also larger 
national or international spillovers. In this sense, ICT would behave more like the “win-
win” policies discussed in ibid., p. 444.  In fact, if only the scope but not the average size 
of externalities changes, by construction ICT will lead to a welfare gain.  
This paper studies the first effect of ICT that leads to changes in the size distribution of 
cities. This effect by itself is likely to have a negative impact on welfare as it reduces the 
local externality. However ICT will also have the second effect, on spillovers at a larger 
spatial scope, which will not affect the distribution of economic activity in space, but is 
likely to have important implications for the growth of aggregate total factor productivity 
over time. This effect will have positive effects on welfare. In order to understand the 
ultimate welfare effects of ICT, one needs to account for both the local and national or 
international effects. As a first step, we have studied the local implications of ICT only. 
The theory presented above implies that we can expect to see agents reallocating across 
cities as a result of improvements in ICT. Moreover, our empirical results imply both that 
the reallocation that we have observed, and that will likely observe in the future, are 
substantial. Moving costs are also important and we have not commented on them so far 
in this paper. Some of these costs are due to regulation and lack of flexibility in labour 
markets. Others reflect frictions in the adjustment of urban public infrastructure. Yet other 
costs are due to the cost of selling and buying homes, and the actual transport and 
organizational costs involved in moving across cities. Our results highlight the importance 
of government policy in reducing this type of costs. If moving costs are artificially high, 
because of government regulation and various types of interference, economies will not be 
able to take advantage of the gains associated with the ICT improvements, since agents 
will not respond by redistributing themselves accordingly in space.  
It is imperative to allow for the natural reallocation that will result from further 
improvements in ICT. After all, this reallocation across space is the adjustment by the 
individuals and by firms to an economic environment where physical location is 
becoming less important. 
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BOX 1: Zipf’s law and the Pareto distribution 
 
Zipf’s law for cities [Zipf (1949)] is an empirical regularity that has attracted 
considerable interest by researchers. In its strict version, which is also known as the rank-
size rule, the law is a deterministic rule that states that the second largest city is half the 
size of the largest, the third largest city is a third of the size of the largest city, etc. To 
illustrate, let us take a country (for instance the US), and order its cities by population: 
New York as the largest has rank 1, Los Angeles as the second largest has rank 2, etc. 
We then draw a graph, known as Zipf’s plot (see Fig. B.1): on the y-axis, we place the 
log of the rank (New York has log rank ln1, Los Angeles log rank ln2); on the x-axis, the 
log of the population of the corresponding city (which will be called the size of the city). 
If the rank-size rule holds, this produces a downwards sloping line with slope equal to -1.  
Generally, and to a remarkable extent, statistical analyses for many different countries, 
as Gabaix (1999) emphasizes and Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) discuss in detail, obtain 
estimated coefficients that are concentrated often around one. This indicates that the size 
distribution of cities is well approximated by Zipf's law with coefficient one. 
Nevertheless, there is substantial variation in Zipf's coefficients across time and across 
countries, a fact that ought to cause some doubts as to full validity of the law.  
Consider the three Zipf plots on Fig. B.1. They look quite similar to one another, yet 
the slopes of ordinary least squares lines fitted to them are not equal to -1.  Note that the 
plot for France is steeper than that for UK which in turn is steeper than that of the US; the 
respective estimates are -1.55, -1.46, and -1.37, are all estimated with very high precision 
and using 96, 232 and 552 observations, respectively. Note also that the plot for the US is 
furthest to the right because its cities are larger than those of the UK with the same rank, 
whose plot in turn is further out than that of France, for the same reason. The techniques 
employed in the main part of the paper are aimed at backing out from such differences 
the effect of ICT across countries and over time. 
Figure B.1. Zipf's plots for three countries. 
About here. 
 Can we obtain Zipf’s law by means of theoretical arguments? The simplest direct 
theoretical argument one could make would be by invoking Gibrat’s law. If different 
cities grow randomly with the same expected growth rate and the same variance (Gibrat’s 
Law for means and variances of growth rate), then the limit distribution of city sizes 
converges to Zipf ’s law. See Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) for an extensive discussion of 
this issue. Empirically, on the other hand, Zipf’s law for cities is an instance of a power 
law (see further below for details). Power laws are attractive in various sciences, 
especially in physics, because they are “scale free”, in that they do not depend on the 
definitions of units of measurement. Naturally, this is an important concern in physics. 
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) provide a rigorous justification for a power law that is 
directly rooted in economic theory. It follows as a special case of the model outlined in 
Appendix A. 
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A power law of cities states that the proportion of cities that are greater than a 






ζ⎛ ⎞> = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (B.1) 
where ζ denotes a negative parameter, and  the lower boundary of the distribution, oS
also a parameter and itself a function of the various determinants of city sizes as 
discussed in the main body of the paper and Appendix A. The mean city size and the 
variance associated with the law given by Equation (B.1), which is also known as a 
Pareto probability distribution, are given by: 
2
2
01 ( 1) ( 2)
{ } ; { } .oS E S S V S S
ζ
ζ ζ ζ+ + += = = oζ  (B.2) 
The mean is finite, if 1;ζ >  the variance is finite, if 2.  Zipf’s law is the case of ζ >
a Pareto law with . 1ζ = − These properties also help underscore that the rank-size rule 
cannot correspond to a reasonable probability distribution, strictly speaking, as such a 
distribution would have neither a finite mean nor a finite variance.  
With these caveats, it is still interesting to note that with our data, reasonable good 
statistical fits are obtained when we regress the log rank against log city size and a 
constant, which is the so-called Zipf regression. Interestingly, for all country-year pairs 
we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the Zipf coefficient is equal to minus one. In 
other words, we strongly reject Zipf’s law, strictly construed.  
“Every cloud has a silver lining,” however. Starting from an empirical law, like Zipf’s 
law, one may motivate a more general and far reaching inquiry into urban structure and 
growth and therefore on the determinants of city size distributions. This is what we have 
sought to do in this paper! 
Our use of the Zipf coefficient as a measure of dispersion in this paper is both original 
and may be easily defended on the basis of the properties of a power law for cities (B.2). 
Specifically, the coefficient of variation, defined as standard deviation divided by the 
mean, is given by .5( /(1 ))ζ ζ+  , and is therefore a monotone increasing function of the 
Zipf coefficient only. Similarly,  the Gini coefficient is given by  .5 1.ζ− +  
We think that rigorous research along the lines of our paper helps caution economists, 
sociologists, urban scientists and econophysicists against undue predictions. E.g., as 
groups of countries integrate, like the EU, economic forces are unleashed which reshape 
their urban systems. What is likely to happen to the sizes of their larger cities and their 
ranks? Zipf’s law offers a straightforward prediction. But is it reliable? We think not, and 
have instead proposed a way to make predictions that rely on underlying determinants of 
city sizes in a dynamic world. 
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APPENDIX A: A Model of ICT, Urban Evolution and City Size Distributions 
We illustrate how to study the role of ICT on the urban hierarchy by considering the basic 
theoretical model in RHW. Total factor productivity, that is the level of technology, in 
industry j  at time t  is given by  
j j
tj tj tj tjA A H N
γ ε=% % % , 
where tjH% and  denote the city's total employment and industry tjN% j  specific human 
capital, and ln tjA  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) productivity shock 
with mean zero and variance ν  across all industries j   and time periods  t. Thus 
parameters jγ  and jε  determine the importance of knowledge spillovers from total 
employment in industry j and industry j-specific human capital in the economy, which are 
external to individual firms in the industry but internal to the urban economy due to the 
presence of city developers. If both parameters jγ  and jε are equal to zero there are no 
external effects and economic activity has no incentive to agglomerate in cities. The larger 
both of these parameters the more important are a city's total human capital and 
employment in determining tjA% city-specific total factor productivity industry j. 
A very simple way to introduce the effect of ICT is therefore to let these two parameters 
vary with the quality of information technology, .ι  Namely, let ( )j tγ ι  where 
 and, similarly, let ( ) /j t tγ ι ι∂ ∂ 0< ( )j tε ι  be such that ( ) /j t tε ι ι 0∂ ∂ < . Essentially, this 
assumption amounts to ICT’s increasing the importance of agglomeration effects since 
people located far away can now interact at a smaller cost and so people living in the city 
are less important in determining the city's productivity level. Conversely, we could 
assume that both ( )j tγ ι  and ( )j tε ι  depend positively on the quality of ICT, which 
would be consistent with arguments that emphasize the greater importance of public 
goods as a result of changes in ICT. Which effect dominates is, ultimately, an empirical 
question that we try to settle in this paper. 
In order for city sizes to be well defined, it will be clarified shortly below that we need 
to guarantee that the knowledge spillover parameters jγ  and jε satisfy ( ) ( ) 1 / 2j jγ ι ε ι+ <  for all . Otherwise, cities would, in a sense, be too productive and 
therefore would grow unboundedly since agglomeration effects would dominate 
congestion costs at all population levels. As long as this condition is satisfied, as a city 
grows eventually congestion costs become more important than agglomeration costs and 
so city sizes are finite.  
ι
Cities consist of a central business centre, where all agents work and all production is 
located, and residential areas surrounding it. Each agent consumes the services of one unit 
of land per period. For spatial equilibrium within each city agents should be indifferent 
about where to live in the city. Therefore, equilibrium rents at a distance z from the centre 
should obey ( )( )R z z zτ= − , where z  denotes a city’s radius, where rent is equal to 0. 






z bTR zR z dz z Nπτπ= = =∫ % . 
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since everyone in the city lives in one unit of land, a city of population N~  and 
.3/2 2






TCC z zdz bNπ τ= =∫ % .  
Assuming the presence of city developers or governments that internalize city-wide 
externalities, RHW show that in this framework the unique equilibrium allocation may be 
obtained as a solution to the following planning problem13: Choose state contingent 
sequences { } ,
0, 1
, , , , , ,
J
tj tj tj tj tj tj tj t j
C X N u K Hμ ∞= =  to maximize 
0
0 1





E N C Nδ δ∞
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0
1 (1 )t j tj j tj j
1H H B u B+ ⎡= + −⎣ ⎤⎦ , (A.5) 
where:  and , ,tj tj tjN K X tjH denote total employment, total physical capital, physical 
capital investment, and total human capital in industry in the economy and j jα and jβ  
are positive parameters satisfying 0 1j jα β< + < tjC;  denotes total consumption of 
representative household i, and  the number of cities producing goods in industry tjμ j ; 
 denotes the fraction of time agent i devotes to work. Thus, the maximization problem 
above amounts to maximizing the sum total of households’ lifetime utilities, (A.1), 
subject to: a resource constraint, Equation (A.2), which expresses that the use of resources 
for consumption, investment, and commuting costs may not exceed current output (and 
presupposes that rents are redistributed back to the city residents); a labour market 
equilibrium condition, Equation (A.3), according to which the total labour force is 
allocated to all industries and all cities (free labour mobility); and the two factor 
accumulation equations, for physical and human capital. That is, respectively, Equation 
(A.4), according to which current investment and the existing capital stock produce 
capital stock in the next period (with 
tju
jω being a parameter satisfying 0 1jω< < ), and 
                                                          
13 RHW describe how to solve for an equilibrium in which some of the externalities are 
not internalized by city planners or developers and, therefore, cities are inefficient. 
Independently of the ability to internalize all potential urban externalities or not, this 
problem can be solved using a pseudo-planner problem and in all cases yields results we 
underscore in this paper. The main role that city developers or city governments play is 
to coordinate agents to work in the equilibrium number of cities. Land developers and 
city governments traditionally have played this coordination role by offering guarantees 
and incentives to locate in a particular area.    
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Equation (A.5), where human capital is augmented at a rate that depends on the portion of 
each individual’s endowment of leisure not allocated for work.  
  The problem of maximizing with respect to the number of cities tjμ  is a static problem 
with first order condition 
( ) 212 j j j j j j j j j jj jtj
tj tj tj tj tj tj tj
tj
N
s A K H N u
b
β α γ α β ε α β γ εγ ε μμ
+ − − + − − − −⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥= = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
So the size of a city, , with core industry tjs j  is then given by  
( ) ( )11 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ2 ˆj j j j j j jj j
tj j tj tj tj tj tjs F A H Kb
γ ε
α β α β φγ ε − + − −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+⎢⎢ ⎥= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
N u ⎥⎥ , (A.6) 
where the auxiliary variables ˆtjA , ˆ jα , ˆ jβ ,and ˆjφ  are defined as: 
( )11 2ˆ j j
tj tjA A
γ ε− += , ( )ˆ 1 2 j jj j j
α γα γ ε
+= − + , 
( )ˆ 1 2 jj j j
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− −= − + . 
Given this log-linear specification, RHW show that capital investments and 
consumption in each industry are constant fractions of output net of commuting costs, and 
the fraction of time devoted to work  is constant across time. Taking natural logarithms 
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 (A.7) 
where the auxiliary variable  includes all non-stochastic variables that enter the 
planning problem, including  and .     
tjψ
tjN tjH
If ln tjA  and tjK  are the sole stochastic variables in Equation (A.7), then the mean and 
variance of city sizes are easily obtained and given, respectively, by  
( )
( ) ( )21 ˆln 2 ln ln
1 2
j j
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V s V Kν βγ ε
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. 
It is now clear why condition ( ) ( ) 1 / 2j jγ ι ε ι+ <  must hold. They are to ensure that 
the mean and variance of the city size distribution are mathematically well defined. RHW 
show that as ∞→t  the variance of the log of physical capital in industry j is:  
( )0 2ln ˆ1tj jV K
ν
β
⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ +
,  
THE EFFECT OF ICT ON URBAN STRUCTURE 29 
 
so that the variance of the long run log-city size distribution may be obtained from (A.8) 
and given by  




1 2 1 2
j
tj
j j j j j
V s
βν γ ε γ ε β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎡ ⎤ = +⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜− + − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎝ ⎠
⎞ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎟⎠
. (A.9) 
Note that the variance of the city size distribution is then increasing in ( ) ( )j t j tγ ι ε ι+ . 
Therefore, any assumption that we make about the dependence of these elasticities on ICT 
is reflected on changes on the invariant distribution of city sizes. 
In the example of section 3 in the main text, roughly speaking, the parameter 
( ) ( )j t j tγ ι ε ι+  corresponds to ε  here. The parameter τ corresponds to b here. 
 We would also like to connect the variance of the distribution of city sizes to the Zipf's 
coefficient, in order to be able to connect our theoretical results with the data through this 
coefficient. The local Zipf coefficient is given by the elasticity of the counter-cumulative 
of the city size distribution, , with respect to city size, (P s S> )




P s S S
ζ ∂ >= <> ∂ . 
Given the mean of the distribution of city sizes, as we increase the variance we are 
shifting mass to the tails of the distribution. This implies that for  high enough (large 
enough city sizes) the term 
S
( )Sζ  will be smaller the larger the variance. As the 
variance goes to infinity,  ( ) 2,Sζ > − ( )limS Sζ→∞  converges to the Pareto coefficient.  
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APPENDIX B: One-step estimation 
Earlier versions of this paper reported one-step estimation results for the relationship 
between telephone mainlines and the Zipf coefficient. This appendix reports these earlier 
results for comparison. While the one-step procedure is more efficient, it is less intuitive 
and requires slightly stronger assumptions on the error term. 
In the one-step procedure we substitute ctζˆ  from Equation (4) into equation (3) and 
estimate directly:  
[ ]ict ct c ict ict ct ict ictR P t P X Pλ θ δ η∗ = + + + + e∗ , (5) 
where  is now composed of an i.i.d. error plus the interaction between 
rank and error from the first step, while all other coefficients and variables are as defined 
before. The interacted variable 
ict ict ct icte e Pε∗ = +
ct ictX P is instrumented by using the predicted values from 
a regression of ct ictX P  on ct ictZ P  and the other exogenous explanatory variables (see 
Wooldridge (2007, pp. 235) for why this is the correct approach). 
Results for telephones and internet usage per capita are reported in Tables 6 and 7 
respectively. Focusing only on our key variables of interest, we see that this one-step 
procedure gives the same substantive effect of telephones and internet usage on urban 
structure although the more efficient estimation procedure increases the significance of 
the coefficients.  As the one-step estimation procedure requires stronger assumptions on 
the error term, and as these particular empirical results do not correct for the resulting 
complicated error structure in (5), we view these results as placing an upper bound on the 
significance of the two core explanatory variables of the urban structure, telephone lines 
and internet users per capita. 




Figure 1. Private Cars, Mobile Phones and Personal Computers.  
Source: Comin and Hobijin (2004). 
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Figure 2. Estimated Zipf Coefficients against Telephone Mainlines per 1000  
Inhabitants, different countries and years. Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Phone Lines per Capita on the Size Distribution of Cities. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 






















Figure B.1. Zipf's plots for three countries.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
